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Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Centuryt
David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Mark Wendell DeLaquil*
I. INTRODUCTION
No aspect of the Bush Administration's foreign policy has caused greater
consternation in Europe, at the United Nations, and among the Academy than
the doctrine of "preemption."' As the President has made clear, both in the
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America ("NSS") 2 and in
numerous other public statements, the United States claims the legal right to
take military action to preempt gathering threats to its national security, with or
without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Despite the outraged cries of
critics, both at home and abroad, the doctrine of preemptive self-defense is wellgrounded in customary international law, fully consonant with the UN Charter,
and promises to be an indispensable part of American statecraft in the twentyfirst century.

f

2

This Article is a revised and expanded version of an article to appear in the Naval War College
Blue Book Series, entitled InternationalLaw Challenges: Homeland Securit and Combating Terrorism
(spec ed 2004) (forthcoming 2005).
David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey are partners in the Washington office of Baker &
Hostetler, LLP. Mr. Rivkin served in the White House Counsel's Office and in the Departments
of Justice and Energy during the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations. He is a visiting fellow at
the Nixon Center and a member of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, an expert body advising the UN Human Rights Commission. Mr. Casey also
served in the Justice Department, in the Office of Legal Policy and the Office of Legal Counsel,
during the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations. Mr. DeLaquil is an associate in the
Washington office of Baker & Hostetler, LLP.
The discussion that follows uses the terms preemption and anticipatory self-defense
interchangeably to describe the use of force undertaken in anticipation of an enemy attack or
hostile action. This is deliberate, as it is the authors' contention that the doctrine of preemption
is, in all
important respects, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as developed through the
actual practice of states.
The NSS also described preemptive force's lengthy historical antecedents and legal tradition.
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15 (Sept 2002),
available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/NSC/NSS.pdf> (visited Oct 19, 2004).
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In the past, preemption often has been described as "anticipatory" selfdefense, and it is an integral part of the most fundamental legal right, the right to
self-preservation, held by individuals and states alike. It was described by
Emmerich de Vattel, one of the eighteenth century's great international law
"publicists," as follows:
[O]n Occasion, where it is impossible, or too dangerous to wait for an
absolute certainty, we may justly act on a reasonable presumption. If a
stranger presents his piece at me in a wood, I am not yet certain that he
intends to kill me; but shall I, in order to be convinced of his design, allow
him to fire? What reasonable casuist will deny me the right of preventing
him? But presumption becomes nearly equal to a certainty, if the prince,
power, has already manifested
who is on the point of rising to an enormous
3
ambition.
insatiable
and
pride
unlimited
an
Vattel, of course, was writing to justify armed action against Louis XIV's
France (after the Bourbon family inherited the Spanish throne-and empire-in
1701), but the rule is equally applicable to modern dangers, whether in the form
of transnational terrorist networks or rogue states seeking weapons of mass
destruction ("WMD"). As a practical matter, no state can be expected to watch
threats to its security develop and then to accept and absorb a first strike before
itself taking action. Neither law nor reason would support such a result.
This is not to say, of course, that the doctrine of preemption cannot be, or
has not been, abused. Over time, states have often used the right of anticipatory
self-defense as a pretext for aggression. Indeed, only a hopelessly unimaginative
statesman would be unable to articulate some plausible-sounding defense claim
for belligerent aims, whatever they might be. In 1939, for example, Hitler
invaded Poland because of alleged Polish incursions into German territory, and
later attacked the Soviet Union on the pretense that Stalin was planning military
action against the Third Reich.4 Similarly, Stalin sought to cast Moscow's seizure
of the Baltic States and part of Poland as actions undertaken in anticipation of
inevitable capitalist aggression against the socialist motherland. Nevertheless, the
right of self-defense, including the right to preempt an attack before it is
launched, has remained a hardy perennial of international law. Whatever the
fashion in intellectual circles, the government officials actually charged with
protecting their nations' interests have consistently exercised the option of using
3

Emmerich de Vattel, 3 The Law of Nations 465 (Luke White 1792).

4

German defendants argued during the Nuremberg trial that Hitler's attack against the USSR,
dubbed Operation Barbarosa, "was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an
attack upon Germany, and making preparation to that end." InternationalLaw: Process and Prospect
258 (Transnational 2d ed 1995), quoting International Military Tribunal, Judgment, in 1 Trial of
the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMihtagy Tribunal,NurembeT, 14 November-i October
1946: Official Documents 171, 215 (1947). These arguments were, of course, dismissed by the
Tribunal.
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force in anticipation of attack, even in circumstances where the threat remains
relatively distant and arguably uncertain.
II. THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE

Although the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has existed for centuries,
international law experts generally cite the 1837 Caroline incident for its modern
exposition. That case involved the British destruction of an American steamship
in US territorial waters, near the New York shore of the Niagara River.' Britain
claimed the right to take this action because the Caroline had been used, and
would likely be used again, to support a rebellion then ongoing in Canada.
Despite calls for war as a result of this British "invasion," the United States
ultimately accepted a British apology. In that context, American Secretary of
State Daniel Webster acknowledged that anticipatory action may be taken in selfdefense, although he sought to define those circumstances more narrowly than
those actually presented by the Caroline case: "Undoubtedly it is just, that, while
it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defence do
exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of
that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
'' 6
no moment for deliberation.
In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, the actual practice of states
suggested a far broader rule than that articulated by Webster in relation to the
Caroline! In 1587, for example, England's Queen Elizabeth I sent a fleet
commanded by Sir Francis Drake to attack Spanish and Portuguese harborsprimarily Cadiz-in an effort to prevent, or at least delay, the arrival of the

5

This Section draws on David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Darin R. Bartram, Remember the
Caroline, Natl Rev 17 (July 1, 2002). For a more thorough description of the Caroline incident,
see Kenneth R. Stevens, Border Dolomagy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-AmericanCanadianRelaions, 1837-1842, 121 (Alabama 1989).

6

Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, Letter to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug 6,
1842), reprinted in John Bassett Moore, 2 A Digest of InternationalLaw 412 (GPO 1906).

7

Some commentators have also argued the entire Caroline incident is miscast as an exemplar of
the anticipatory self-defense doctrine because the ship was used to resupply the Canadian
insurgents prior to its destruction and hence could have been considered to be engaged in
ongoing armed operations against Britain. This claim is, of course, debatable. Regardless of the
actual facts on the ground, however, what makes the Caroline case significant in the
development of customary international law is that both Britain and the United States chose to
apply the anticipatory defense paradigm in setting up the legal framework for handling the
incident--even though they may have disagreed about its proper application to the Caroline
incident. For an excellent discussion of the significance of this point, see generally R.Y.
Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am J Intl L 82 (1938).
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"Invincible Armada." 8 Similarly, in 1801 and 1807, Britain launched preemptive
attacks on the Danish navy to ensure that these "assets" did not fall into French
hands during the Napoleonic Wars. More recently, in 1939, Britain and France
exercised their anticipatory self-defense right in warning Hider that they would
consider an attack on Poland to be a casus belli, and acted accordingly once their
warnings were disregarded. Germany's armed forces were not, of course, at that
time menacing either Britain or France, and the only legal right either state
would have had to issue an ultimatum to Germany-since Poland was not
British or French territory-was rooted in their right to anticipate future
attacks. 9
The writings of early international publicists reflected this practice. Hugo
Grotius endorsed anticipatory self-defense in his monumental treatise, The Law
of War and Peace (1625), noting that self-defense was permissible-both upon
being attacked and also before-where "the deed may be anticipated."'"
Similarly, writing a century later, Vattel made clear that states "may even
anticipate the other's [aggressive] design," although he also cautioned that they
must not "act upon vague and doubtful suspicions."" As Michael Glennon
notes, by the twentieth century, a robust self-defense prerogative was so firmly
rooted in international law that
during the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 [the high
point of the efforts to limit the use of force by states], Secretary of State
Kellogg observed that there was no need to state it expressly in the terms of

8

Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations also mentions a notable eighteenth century
example: Frederick the Great's 1756 preemptive attack on Saxony and Bohemia to forestall
what he perceived to be an impending attack by Russia, France, and Austria. Max Boot, Who
Says We Never Stike First?,NY Times 27 (Oct 4, 2002).

9

In fact, it is this same fundamental principle that justifies NATO's "collective security" scheme,
where more than two dozen states pledged armed support if the territory of any one state were
attacked.
Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace 173 (Clarendon 1925) (Francis W. Kelsey, trans). The
doctrine of anticipatory defense was not, of course, infinitely elastic and could not be properly
invoked to deal with all contingencies. Thus, according to Grotius:

10

[blut quite inadmissible is the doctrine proposed by some, that by the law of
nations it is right to take up arms in order to weaken a rising power, which, if
it grew too strong, might do us harm. I acknowledge that in councils of war
such a question does come up, but not on any ground of justice, only of
expediency. If for any other reason a war would be justified, for this reason it
may seem prudent to undertake it. The authorities cited on the subject say
nothing more. But that the bare possibility that violence may be some day
turned on us gives us the right to inflict violence on others is a doctrine
repugnant to every principle of justice.
Id at 77.
11

Emmerich de Vattel, 3 The Law of Nations 130 (Carnegie Institution of Washington 1983)
(Charles G. Fenwick, ed).
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the pact; even the adoption of texts that seem inconsistent with exercise of
the right, he said, do not preclude reliance upon it. 12

Moreover, the preemptive use of force has always been an implicit component
of American strategic doctrine and, during the nuclear age, the potential for
13
nuclear "first-use" became an explicit component of American security policy.
Nevertheless, despite this venerable pedigree, 4 the Bush Administration's
critics claim that the NSS's very explicit articulation of preemption as a tool of
America statecraft, and its failure to limit preemption to circumstances involving
imminent threats, violated international law and, in particular, the United
Nations Charter. In fact, although the Charter certainly has limited the legitimate
use of armed force as a means of settling international disputes, it has not
eliminated, or meaningfully limited, the traditional right of self-defense.
III. THE USE OF FORCE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER

Critics of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine are quick to point out that,
whatever may have happened in the past, the adoption of the United Nations
Charter-which requires member states to "settle their international disputes by
peaceful means"-changed everything. Indeed, some scholars have questioned
the relevance of historical state practice, not merely with respect to the
anticipatory self-defense doctrine but even with respect to the overall right of
self-defense. Thus, Professor Dinstein argues that

12

13

14

Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State, Telegram to the US Ambassador in France (Apr 23, 1928),
1 Foreign Rel US 34, 36-37 (1928), quoted in Michael J. Glennon, Military Action against
Terrorists under InternationalLaw: The Fog of Law, Self-Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter,25 Harv J L & Pub Poly 539 n 62 (2002). If a blanket prohibition
against war in its entirety was not sufficient to vitiate the venerable and well-established
customary international law doctrine of self-defense, it follows that a subset of self-defenselike anticipatory self-defense---could not be proscribed sub silencio.
The first-use policy entailed the declared American willingness to use nuclear weapons either in
response to a conventional attack by the Soviet Union or even in anticipation of such an attack.
The US consistently rejected frequent calls, emanating from Moscow and various pro-Soviet
Western disarmament advocates, for a no first-use pledge, asserting that such a declaratory
strategy would undermine the credibility of our deterrence. This was done despite the fact that
US nuclear forces were inherently capable of executing a variety of first-strike options,
irrespective of the US declaratory doctrine. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see
generally Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (MacMillan 1981); Colin S. Gray,
War,Peace and Victory: Strategv and Statecraftforthe Next Century (Simon & Schuster 1990).
For an argument that the Bush Administration's embrace of preemption is not unique and that,
traumatized early in our national history by the 1814 British burning of the White House and
the US Capitol, American statecraft has long made liberal use of, usually unilateral, preemption,
see John Lewis Gaddis, Surrise,Securioy and the American Experience (Harvard 2004).
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[u]p to the point of the prohibition of war [which he views as a relatively
recent development], to most intents and purposes, 'self-defence was not a
legal concept but merely a political excuse for the use of force'. Only when
self-defence emerge
the universal liberty to go to war was eliminated, could
5
as a right of signal importance in international law.'

Although this view would conveniently eliminate much of the precedent
that supports the legality of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, it is based
upon an incorrect premise-that war, including aggressive war, was entirely
lawful until the United Nations was founded. In fact, there have been
international norms governing the legitimate resort to armed force-carrying as
much force and effect of law as any other modern international norm or treaty,
including the UN Charter-since antiquity. 6 Indeed, even by the time Homer
wrote The Iliad, there was a clear recognition that some legitimate casus belli, other
than a desire for plunder, was necessary to justify a resort to war-in that case,
the abduction of a Greek queen. By the close of the Middle Ages in Europe, an
entire theology of "just war" had developed, and the "laws of war" were among
the earliest international norms to be recognized as something more than
"political excuses."' 7 In this regard, Grotius explained that, although "[t]he

15

16

17

Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 160-61 (Cambridge 3d ed 2001), quoting E.
Jimenez de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the PastThird of a Century, 159 RCADI 1, 96 (1978).
Indeed, efforts to constrain substantially the use of violence are as old as, or in some instances
even older than, war itself. While violence in which individuals kill one another has been around
since the dawn of time, war as we understand it did not arise until the advent of the organized
state. Indeed, in the words of noted American anthropologist Harry Turney-High, the key
indicia of the organized state's existence was "the rise of the army with officers." Harry TurneyHigh, Primitive War Its Practice and Concepts 253 (South Carolina 2d ed 1971), quoted in John
Keegan, A History of Wlajfare 91 (Vintage 1994). Before that time, primitive societies dwelled, in
Turney-High's apt formulation, "below the military horizon." Interestingly, despite the major
differences between the primitive combat, prewar style, and the organized war, both were
governed by an elaborate set of rules. For an excellent discussion of complex cultural and
religious strictures governing and limiting the use of force in societies existing both "below the
military horizon" and above, see Keegan, A History of Wayfare at 24-46, 84-136.
Thejus ad bellum's focus was on providing the ethical and legal guidance to the just-in the form
of the so-called just war theory-who were expected to conform their use-of-force decisions to
a complex set of ethical principles. The just war theory blended the moral theology of St.
Augustine and other Christian theologians with the legal principles of Hugo Grotius and other
international law scholars. Significantly, restraining the wrongdoers was an altogether different
and difficult (some would have said hopeless) enterprise, and there was no particular
expectation that they would adhere to the just war theory's precepts. Moreover, despite the
recent position of the Vatican on Iraq and other modern armed conflicts, traditional just war
thinking did not view war as a strategy of last resort. Instead, the overarching goal was to
maintain a just order through the means necessary to that end. For an excellent discussion of
the just war theory and its application to contemporary circumstances, see George Weigel, The
Morality of War, 116 Commentary 50 (July 2003); George Weigel, Ethics and Public Policy
Center, Just War and Pre-emption: Three Questions (Oct 2, 2002), available online at
<http://www.eppc.org/news/newsID.1 407/news-detail.asp> (visited Nov 14, 2004).
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grounds of war are as numerous as those of suits at law . . .[t]hree justifiable
causes for war are generally cited: defense, recovery of property, and
punishment."' 8 Likewise, as Balthazar Ayala explained at the start of his 1582
Three Books on the Law of War and on the Duties Connected with War and on Military

Discipline.

How scrupulously the Romans considered what legal principles were
applicable to each occasion, whether of peace or of war, may be learned
from their historians; and it ought not to excite surprise that they were
uniformly so successful in their wars, seeing that they never took up arms
save on just grounds.' 9
One may well disagree with this optimistic conclusion about Roman
political ethics, but there is no doubt that commentators and statesmen thought
in terms of legal obligations with respect to the use of armed force well before
the mid-twentieth century.
A. STASSEN'S REVENGE
These days, of course, those seeking to limit the right of preemptive or
anticipatory self-defense argue that the UN Charter effectively outlawed war,
limiting the use of armed force not otherwise authorized by the UN Security
Council to the narrow set of circumstances articulated in Article 51. In relevant
part, Article 51 provides that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken
' 20
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Because of the phrase "if an armed attack occurs," it often is claimed that,
absent an ongoing armed attack, individual states cannot initiate a military
response. Moreover, there is little doubt that this was the intent of at least some
of the Charter's drafters, particularly Harold Stassen. A perennial candidate for
political office and sometimes Governor of Minnesota, Stassen served on the US
delegation to the San Francisco Conference, which produced the Charter.
Evidently, it was Stassen who insisted that this phrase be included in Article 51.21
Building on his efforts in Article 51, as well as Article 2(4)'s injunction that
18

Grotius, The Law of War and Peace at 72 (cited in note 10).

19

Balthazar Ayala, Three Books on the Law of War and on the Duies Connected with War and on Military

20

Displine 3 (Carnegie Inst 1912) .P. Bate, trans). Ayala's interpretation of the Roman behavior,
while somewhat ahistorical, was in accord with the then-prevailing fashion of ascribing the high
standards of probity and virtue to the statecraft of the ancients, particularly of the Greek and
Roman variety.
United Nations Charter, art 51.

21

Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Militagy Choice without PriorSecurioy Council
Authorizaion?, 5 Wash U J L & Poly 51, 57 (2001).
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member states "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force," others have claimed that "[i]nternational law underwent a metamorphosis
' ' 22 a metamorphosis that effectively left self-defense
...inthe twentieth century,
as little more than the right to return fire.
This reading, however, puts far more weight on the UN Charter than it can
bear. Whether its adoption constituted a "metamorphosis" is a question for the
historians of future generations, rather than the lawyers of today. Although
those who are personally committed to a more internationalist model for
organizing the global community prefer to view the Charter's adoption as a
unique watershed in law (they might usefully recall that Tsar Alexander I also
considered his Holy Alliance to be a new and permanent organizing principle),
the United Nations Charter is nothing more than a treaty-part and parcel of
the general settlement at the close of World War II. Indeed, at the time the
Charter was drafted and ratified in 1945-46, its membership was almost entirely
composed of the victorious Allies-who to this day remain the only permanent
(and veto-wielding) members of the Security Council. Moreover, and perhaps
more to the point, that document must be interpreted as a whole and against the
legal background in which it was adopted, i.e., in accordance with the otherwise
extant rules of international law.
B. READING THE CHARTER
Upon joining the United Nations, member states accept a general
obligation to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means,' 23 and there
is no doubt that the Charter was intended to make the resort to war more
difficult. However, at no point does the Charter reserve to the United Nations
alone, or its Security Council, the legal authority to authorize military action.
Rather, it defines three circumstances in which force cannot be employed by UN
members. In this regard, Article 2(4) provides that: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 24 Thus, based on the
plain language of this provision, the use of force is prohibited only when it is
designed to deprive a State of territory, destroy its independence, or is otherwise
inconsistent with the UN's purposes.
Those purposes include, first and foremost:

22

Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 Harv J L & Pub Poly 877, 878 (2004).

23

United Nations Charter, art 2,

24

Id, art 2,

3.

4.
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To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformily with the priniples of
justice and internationallaw, adjustment or settlement of international disputes

25
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Any use of force not inconsistent with these purposes and not designed to
seize territory or impose a colonial-style government on another state is not
forbidden by the Charter. Moreover, those who argue that the Charter vests the
right to authorize the use of force only in the Security Council tend to ignore the
words highlighted above-especially "security," "effective," and "international
law." Military actions taken to preserve international security and ensure
effective action that are otherwise consistent with international law-as that law
existed when the Charter was adopted-are manifestly permitted. Further, the
primary responsibility of the United Nations is to maintain the global peace (i.e.,
the general peace established at the close of World War II).26 Obviously, there
are times when that peace can be maintained only through the use of force-an
eternal truth acknowledged even by the UN's spiritual father, Woodrow Wilson,
who sent young Americans to die on Europe's battlefields in a "war to end all
wars." 27 Nothing in the Charter suggests, however, that every use of force by
states must inherently be considered a threat to that peace.
This construction of the Charter is fully supported by its other provisions.

Most importantly, although Chapter VII outlines the authority of the Security

Council, it nowhere forbids unilateral action by individual states. Rather,
consonant with the UN's purpose, to "maintain . . . international peace and

security," the Security Council is granted the authority-indeed, it is requiredto "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
,,28 These may or may not involve the use of armed force. If
shall be taken .
the Security Council opts for a military response, it also is given the right to call
upon some or all of the member states to provide the necessary forces and to
impose an obligation on member states to respond in these circumstances.29
1 (emphasis added).

25

Id, art 1,

26

27

This interpretation of "the peace" as the general or global peace is confirmed in Chapter VIII
of the Charter, which makes clear that regional arrangements designed to maintain regional
peace and security are permissible, simply imposing an obligation to ensure that these
arrangements also are consistent with the UN's purposes. See id, arts 52-54.
Similarly, traditional just war theory has also justified the use of force by reference to the

28

overarching need to maintain just and secure order. See Weigel, 116 Commentary at 50 (cited in
note 17).
United Nations Charter, art 39.

29

See id, arts 42-43, 48.
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It is, of course, Chapter VII in which Article 51 appears. Putting aside
questions regarding the meaning of "armed attack," it is important to recall that
Article 51 neither creates, nor abolishes, a right of self-defense. Nor, for that
matter, does it purport to define one. In fact, by its own terms it appears to be
nothing more than a rule of construction-making clear that nothing else in the
Charter purports to eliminate the right of self-defense in the face of armed
attack, and providing an example of an instance where the self-defense right
would clearly apply-an illustration of a much broader set of self-defense-related
powers available to all sovereign states.3 ° Thus, even if Governor Stassen's
purpose was to eliminate anticipatory self-defense, he left the job unfinished.31
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Charter could have limited
the ability of states to defend themselves against an obvious, growing threat that
has not, as yet, manifested itself in a first strike. As a rule, customary
international law norms can be modified by treaty, at least among the parties to a
particular agreement, or by inconsistent state practice. There are, however,
certain rules that are so fundamentally a part of the international system that
they cannot be altered by treaty. These norms are identified by the Latin termjus
cogens, and there is no end of debate about what principles may fall within this

30

31

A number of scholars have construed Article 51 in this way. See, for example, Myres S.
McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order232-41 (Yale 1961);
Case Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActiities in and againstNicaragua (Nicaraguav United States),
1986 ICJ 347-48 (1986) (Schwebel dissenting). It is also worth noting that Article 51 refers only
to an armed attack "against a member of the United Nations." When the Charter was ratified
and for decades thereafter, a number of states chose not to join the UN. To construe Article 51
as the exclusive nle for using force that has completely supplanted the traditional customary
law norms would mean such states would have no self-defense rights at all. For a view that
Article 51 does proscribe anticipatory self-defense, see Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law
and Foreign Poliy 295 (Columbia 2d ed 1979); Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 165-66
(MacMillan 1952).
Article 51's language aside, its rather accidental legislative history does not support the claim
that most of the Charter's drafters conceived of it as an important substantive right-creating
provision. Andru Wall notes that
Article 51 was not in the original [Charter] drafts because the drafters believed
the customary international law right of self-defense was incorporated without
alteration into the Charter. The US delegation in San Francisco proposed
Article 51 to ensure that the obligations of collective self-defense against
armed attacks arising from the Chapultepec Act were incorporated into the
Charter. While self-defense was uniformly accepted as a customary right of
States, collective self-defense was an emerging right.
Andru Wall, InternationalLaw and the Bush Doctrine, 33 Israeli Handbook Hum Rts 193, 200-01
(2004). Moreover, the fact that the ICJ, in considering one of the most important cases
concerning the use of force to come before it (in the Nicaragua decision), chose to parse the
customary international law for guidance provides a compelling rebuttal of the arguments that
the entire body of customary jus ad bellum was displaced by the Charter. See Nicaragua v United
States, 1986 ICJ at 347 (cited in note 30).
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critical category. The right of self-defense, however, is certainly among them. As
Vattel explained:
In treating of the law of safety, we have shewn that nature gives men a right
to use force, when it is necessary for their defence, and the preservation of
demonstrates
their rights. This principle is generally acknowledged; reason
32
it, and nature herself has engraven it on the heart of man.
As noted above, this right has been considered to be so fundamental that it
was acknowledged even in the context of the most extravagant treaty-driven
effort to "oudaw" war, the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 33 As American Secretary of
State Frank Kellogg explained during his eponymous Pact's negotiation, the
right of self-defense was so well-settled in customary, international law that
"there was no need to state [the customary right of self-defense] expressly in the
inconsistent with
terms of the pact [and] even the adoption of texts that seem
34
it."
upon
reliance
preclude
not
do
...
right
the
of
exercise
Thus, it is highly questionable whether a key aspect of the overall selfdefense right that allows nations to anticipate a threat before the damage actually
is done can be modified-or somehow transferred to the UN Security Council.35
This is particularly the case in an age where absorbing a first strike may well
mean accepting casualties on a massive, or even decisive, scale. Vesting exercise
of the anticipatory self-defense right in the Security Council-where five often
mutually competitive if not outright hostile powers enjoy veto authority-would
effectively destroy that right. Indeed, it is significant that, throughout its entire
operating history, both during the Cold War and after, the Security Council has
never acted in the way that opponents of a preemptive right, based on a
restrictive reading of the Charter, expected it to act.36 Although the Council has
determined on several occasions that a breach of the peace or a threat to the
peace existed, it has never actually mandated the use of military force for
enforcement measures. At the time the UN adopted the Korean War
Resolution3 7 and the Gulf War Resolution,38 which clearly are its strongest
32

Vattel, 3 The Law of Naions at 438 (cited in note 3).

33

See Treaty providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(Kellogg-Briand Pact), 46 Star 2343 (1928).
Kellogg, Telegram to the US Ambassador in France (cited in note 12).

34
35

A jus cogens principle could, at least in theory, be altered based on the agreement of all states.
The UN Charter, however, did not command such universal assent at the time it was adopted,
and subsequent state practice suggests that the "Stassen" view has not in the years since been
accepted as the correct interpretation of Article 51.

36

For a useful discussion of how the Security Council did not live up to its billing, see generally
Thomas M. Franck, Who illedArticle 2(4)?, 64 Am J Intl L 809 (1970).

37

Security Council Res No 83, UN Doc S/RES/83 (1950).
Security Council Res No 678, UN Doc S/RES/678 (1990).

38
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actions to date, the Council simply recommended that member states render
assistance to South Korea and Kuwait.
Overall, Article 51 is best understood as the practical equivalent of a "safe
harbor" in American administrative law.39 If an armed attack occurs, then the
use of force to repel it, per se, will not be considered to be a threat to
international peace and security. By contrast, if an armed attack has not already
been launched, then a state using force must weigh all of the circumstances,
going through the type of analysis set forth in Article 2(4), in considering
whether a threat may be preempted-being sure, in Vattel's phrase, to avoid
acting upon "vague and doubtful suspicions."4
39

Indeed, given the wording of Article 51, some international law experts have argued that, rather
than constraining the ambit of self-defense powers, the Charter's drafters "merely desired to list
one situation in which a state could clearly exercise that tight." See Anthony C. Arend and
Robert J. Beck, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN CharterParadigm73 (Roudedge
1993). D.W. Bowett also described Article 51 as being "declaratory of an existing right." D.W.
Bowett, The Use ofForce in the Protection of Nationals,43 Transactions of the Grotius Society 111,
115-16 (1962) ("[A]rt 51 is permissive not prohibitive and, as we have seen, the only prohibitive
article (art. 2(4)), leaves the tight of self-defence unimpaired.'. This interpretation of Article 51
is buttressed by similarly laconic treatment of self-defense related matters in the language of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, reflecting the doctrine's well-established character. See text accompanying
note 34. William H. Taft, IV, the State Department's current Legal Advisor, also notes that:
[t]he notion of preemption is inherent in the right of self-defense, recognizing
the need to adapt the concept of imminence [of the anticipated attack] to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. The use of force
preemptively in self-defense is the right of each state and does not require
Security Council action.

40

William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buckwald, Symposium, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq
Conflict: Preemption, Iraq, and InternationalLaw, 97 Am J Ind L 557, 557 n 1 (July 2003).
Vattel, 3 The Law of Nations at 130 (cited in note 11). The view that Article 51 is meant only to
be a safe harbor has been vociferously criticized by the advocates of the restrictive reading of
the Charter. For example, Yoram Dinstein wonders,
[w]hat is the point in stating the obvious (i.e., that an armed attack gives rise to
the right of self-defence), while omitting a reference to the ambiguous
conditions of preventive war? Preventive war in self-defence (if legitimate
under the Charter) would require regulation by lex scripta more acutely than a
response to an armed attack, since the opportunities for abuse are
incomparably greater.
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence at 168 (cited in note 15). However, this criticism
manifests an obvious failure to grasp that the whole idea of a legal safe harbor is to delineate
precisely those circumstances that can be easily dealt with, leaving the more difficult
circumstances to a case-by-case analysis. Thus, the whole purpose of Article 51 is to indicate
that, whenever one uses force after he has been the victim of an armed attack, he is always
legally in the right and no further analysis of the circumstances is necessary. By contrast, it is
precisely because the application of anticipatory self-defense can be, and has been, used as a
pretext for aggression----d la Hitler or Stalin-that a more complex, all-facts-and-circumstancestype analysis under Article 2 is necessary. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
framers of the Charter were quite familiar with the arguments used by both the Nazi and
Japanese leadership (which were rejected during the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials)
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C. IMPLEMENTING THE CHARTER
In addition, Article 51 must be interpreted in accordance with international
law generally. Arguments that the Charter swept away all that had gone before
are belied both by its language-as noted above, even the instrument's primary
purposes are framed with reference to international law-and by the Charter's
application over the past sixty years. In fact, this is the most important indicia of
the Charter's meaning. As the Marquise de Merteuil suggested in Choderlos De
Laclos's Les Liaisons Dangereuses, don't listen to what people tell you, watch what
they do. In the international law arena, the actual practice of states continues to

determine both the applicable norms, whether customary or conventional, and
their proper interpretation.
In the years since the UN Charter was adopted, states have frequently
invoked the right to use armed force to defend their interests, particularly the
right to use anticipatory or preemptive force.4' Indeed, as Professor Michael
Glennon (who argues that the Charter was designed to forbid preemptive or
anticipatory self-defense) has noted:
States can no longer be said to regard the Charter's rules concerning
anticipatory self-defense--or concerning the use of force in general, for that
matter-as binding. The question-the sole question, in the consent-based
international legal system-is whether states have in fact agreed to be
bound by the Charter's use-of-force rules. If states had truly intended to
make those rules obligatory, they would have made the cost of violation
greater than the perceived benefits.
They have not. The Charter's use-of-force rules have been widely and
regularly disregarded. Since 1945, two-thirds of the members of the United
291 interstate conflicts in
Nations-126 states out of 189-have fought
42
which over 22 million people have been killed.

41

42

that they were engaged in anticipatory self-defense. Looking to the future, leaders of a state that
has used force in a manner consistent with Article 51 could feel safe from prosecution, even if
they had lost the war. It is also worth noting that interpreting Article 51 as a safe harbor
provision harmonizes it with Article 2(4); by contrast, a "broad" interpretation of Article 51,
barring all unilateral uses of force except in response to an armed attack, would render Article
2(4) entirely superfluous. This interpretive approach, which vitiates of any meaning one or more
provision of a treaty or a statute, is, of course, strongly disfavored.
Significantly, neither the ICJ nor any other international tribunal has ever expressly considered
the post-1945 legality of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ
"noted that since the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed
attack has not been raised, the Court expresses no view on that issue." Nicaraguav United States,
1986 ICJ at 343 (cited in note 30).
Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Casefor Anidpatoy Sef-Defense, Weekly Standard 24,
27 (July 28, 2002). See also Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security CouncilFailed,82 Foreign Aff 16
(May/June 2003).
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The 1956 "Suez Crisis," where France, Britain, and Israel launched military
operations against Egypt based on President Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal,
must be counted as among the most important post-Charter uses of force
without Security Council authorization. The affair was a political disaster for the
governments involved, but it is highly significant that Britain and France-both
charter members of the United Nations and permanent members of the Security
Council-claimed that the Israeli-Egyptian military clash, which took place in
close proximity to the Suez Canal, was a threat to the world's economy and
therefore adequate to justify armed action. Needless to say, this was a very broad
formulation of anticipatory self-defense indeed, since the fighting around the
Suez Canal posed no threat to the British or French territories.
Similarly, in 1967, Israel launched a preemptive war against Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan. It was neither condemned nor sanctioned by the UN for this action.
In 1981, Israel also attacked and destroyed an Iraqi nuclear power facility, again
citing "self-defense" as justification. Although on this occasion the Security
Council condemned Israel's action, no action was taken to address this supposed
"aggression." Recalling the Marquise's maxim, whatever the verbiage used, this
international inaction strongly suggests a fundamental recognition that Israel
acted in accordance with her rights under international law to anticipate, and foil,
attacks before they are launched. Significantly, this action stretched anticipatory
self-defense to a point arguably inconsistent with Grotius's view, which would
not permit attacking a "rising" power that might, at some indefinite point in the
future, pose a threat.
Israel, of course, has not been alone in exercising the right of anticipatory
self-defense. In 1982, Britain claimed a two-hundred mile exclusion zone,
applicable to all non-British vessels, around the Falkland Islands, and in 1983,
Sweden asserted the right to use armed force against any foreign submarine
sailing within twelve miles of her territorial sea. President Reagan in 1986
ordered attacks against terrorist targets in Libya to prevent their future use
against US interests. 43 In 1989, the George H.W. Bush Administration forcibly
ousted Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, arguing he posed a threat to the
safety of the American service members present in Panama and their families.
All of these actions can be justified only by a right of anticipatory self-defense.
However, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is probably the most important
modern example, before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched, of preemptive
or anticipatory self-defense. In order to prevent the installation of Russian short-

43

Significantly, at the time, President Reagan described the US bombing raid as a "preemptive
action" that was "fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." Ronald W.
Reagan, President of the United States, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against
L'/ya (Apr 14, 1986), 1 Pub Papers 468, 469 (1986).
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and intermediate-range offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba-which could have
reached most of the continental United States in a matter of minutes-the
Kennedy Administration imposed a "quarantine" on the island. This was, in
reality, a blockade, directed at the Soviet ships delivering nuclear missiles to arm
the installations, and constituted a belligerent act under the traditional rules of
international law. This blockade was publicly justified as an act of self-defense,
both of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, by senior US
government officials, up to and including President Kennedy. This was the case
even though no actual attack had been launched by either the Soviet Union or
Cuba, nor was there any imminent threat that the Russian missiles would be
launched at the United States once they were in place.
In making the case for a robust American response to this new
deployment, President Kennedy emphasized numerous factors: the purpose of
the Soviet deployments-"to provide a nuclear strike capability against the
Western Hemisphere"; the fact that the buildup was "secret, swift and
extraordinary"; the notion that the Soviet conduct amounted to "a deliberately
provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted
by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again
by either friend or foe"; and last, but not least, the point that the Soviet leaders
had been lying through their teeth about their actions. 44 Although the US threat
assessment was also shaped by a perception that the impulsive (and possibly
irrational) Khrushchev had engaged in nuclear saber-rattling, threatening the
United States in Berlin and elsewhere, Kennedy's bottom-line conclusion was
clearly that, in a nuclear age, an effort by an avowed American foe to change
precipitously the strategic balance of power was itself a sufficient threat to
American security to justify the use of force.4" If his actions in this regard were

legally justified by anything, it was the anticipatory self-defense doctrine.
44

45

John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Radio and Television Report to the American People
on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (Oct 22, 1962), Pub Papers 806, 806-07 (1962), available
online at <http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa102100b.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
In 1962, the United States enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union,
approaching something close to a genuine "first strike" capability. This meant that the US could
have eliminated all, or virtually all, of the USSR's long-range nuclear assets-primarily strategic
bombers-in a first strike, while maintaining a substantial probability of escaping Moscow's
retaliation. However, because the Soviet Union had deployed extensive short- and mediumrange nuclear forces, it could have retaliated against European targets. Soviet strategists
understood, though, that this "hostage Europe" strategy was an inadequate basis for a robust
deterrence; thus, Moscow tried to remedy the situation by engaging in the so-called missile
bluff, with the Soviet Party leader Nikita Khruschchev claiming that it was producing and
deploying a large force of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Within months of President
Kennedy taking office, this strategy was exposed and Moscow faced what it perceived to be a
situation of strategic inferiority. For an excellent discussion of the early Soviet nuclear force
posture and associated employment strategy, see generally Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet
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To be sure, several of President Kennedy's former advisors and his
brother, Senator Ted Kennedy, have fiercely disputed the claim that the Cuban
Missile crisis was an exercise in anticipatory self-defense. They note, for
example, that President Kennedy ruled out both a preemptive air strike-which
would have destroyed the Soviet-built facilities designed to house the yet-to-bedelivered missiles-and a general invasion of Cuba, settling instead for a
presumably less provocative naval "quarantine."46 That naval quarantine,
however, was a blockade directed at the Soviet vessels bringing the nuclear
warheads to Cuba. As a matter of law, this was an indisputably belligerent act on

46

Image of Future War (Pub Aff 1959); Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Powerand Soviet
Foreign Poliy (Chicago 1966). See also H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons
and the Revolution in Soiet Mifitagy and PoliticalThinking 28-64 (Praeger 1959). The reason that the
introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba would have fundamentally changed the strategic
equation is because it would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the United States
simultaneously to destroy both bomber bases in Russia and Russian missiles in Cuba. Thus, had
Moscow succeeded in deploying missiles in Cuba, it would have effectively eliminated the
American first strike capability and established a mutually assured destruction-based deterrence
posture. This, of course, is ultimately what occurred, albeit decades later. For a discussion of the
Soviet force posture and strategy in the 1980s, as Moscow began to equal the US in nuclear
war-fighting capabilities, see Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces:
Requirements and Responses 53-55 (Brookings Inst 1982); Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring,
The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms 19-20 (Westview 1984). See also generally John van
Oudenaren, Deterrence, Warfighting and Soviet Militay Doctrine, Adelphi Papers no 210 (Ind Inst
Strategic Studies 1986). The United States certainly expected that the Soviet Union would invest
sufficient resources in the development and deployment of long-range ballistic missiles to
achieve parity with the US. Indeed, a number of US analysts had concluded, based upon the
ambitious nature of the Soviet military writings that proclaimed quite openly Moscow's intent to
fight and win a nuclear war, that the USSR would push for a strategic nuclear superiority. For a
discussion of this set of issues, see Richard Pipes, Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and
Win a Nuclear War, in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds, The Defense Policiesof Nations:A
Comparative Stud 134-46 Johns Hopkins 1982). See also generally David B. Rivkin, Jr., Moscow's
View of the New US Threat, Military Review (Mar 1983); David B. Rivkin, Jr., Wavering Searchlights of
Sovietologv, 16 Strategic Rev 66 (Winter 1988) (book review of William C. Green, Soviet Nuclear
Weapons Poliy: A Research and BibliographicGuide (Westview 1987)). For an alternative, and more
benign, interpretation of the Soviet views and policies, see Robert L. Arnett, Soviet Attitudes
toward Nuclear War Do Thg Really Think They Can Win?, 2 Journal of Strategic Studies 172-91
(Sept 1979). Kennedy's real objection to Khrushchev's attempt to place short- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba was that the missiles would have enabled Moscow
to shift the US-Soviet strategic balance precipitously, in a matter of months, rather than
gradually, over decades. In the context of Iraq, an appropriate analogy would have been
between accepting the basic proposition that Saddam Hussein could have created (or recreated)
a WMD arsenal, provided he did so gradually, and holding that what was really unacceptable
was only a precipitous WMD acquisition. The reason it is worthwhile dwelling on these
distinctions is to underscore that, as far as the Kennedy Administration was concerned, it could
legitimately invoke the anticipatory self-defense doctrine when dealing with a comparatively
attenuated and highly nuanced threat.
Of course, the reason the naval blockade was an effective option was only because the missiles
had not yet been installed in Cuba and could be delivered to the island only by sea.
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Kennedy's part, even if it was more restrained than launching an air strike or
invasion. 7 All three are equally acts of war and could only have been justified by
the United States's right to self-defense. Since no attack had actually been
launched by Soviet or Cuban forces, this exercise of the self-defense right was
anticipatory. If anything, Kennedy's choice of a blockade was merely an effort to
ensure that the American response was proportional to the provocation.48
There are, of course, those who argue that the various instances of
anticipatory self-defense that have occurred since the UN Charter was adopted
have merely been violations of the Charter. This, however, suggests a particularly
dogmatic approach to the Charter's interpretation, as well as a tacit rejection of
the validity of State practice as the lodestone of international law. The fact that
states, including permanent members of the Security Council, have continued to
claim the right to use military force to anticipate and meet threats to their
national security strongly suggests that the UN Charter supplemented, but did
not vitiate, the traditional jus ad bellum norm of anticipatory self-defense. That
instrument, far from being a comprehensive legal edifice barring all uses of force
except Article 51-compliant situations and various forms of collective action,
simply sharpened the long-standing rule against the aggressive use of force and
effectively established a "safe harbor" in Article 51 for the use of force
necessitated by an armed attack.
D. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE "LITE"
Despite state practice, a number of scholars have attempted to shore up
the proposition that only the Security Council can authorize a preemptive use of
force. The undercurrent here appears to be a recognition that the Stassen rule,
whatever its merits were in an age before the advent of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, WMD, and transnational terror is unrealistic today-states can no more
be expected to absorb a potentially catastrophic first strike than Vattel's
wanderer in the woods could be expected to take a bullet in the chest before
defending himself. As a result, a number of compromise positions have been
floated, with Professor Yoram Dinstein's "interceptive" self-defense being the
47

48

The declaration of a blockade has long been acknowledged as the act of a belligerent, see, for
example, The PriZe Cases, 67 US 635, 670 (1863), and it is difficult to see how Kennedy's use of
the word "quarantine" could have changed the legal character of the act. Soviet ships were
forbidden from approaching Cuba, under threat of military force, a threat they, fortunately,
took seriously.
See note 56. Changes in technology and the nature of the threat to the United States have
largely vitiated the proportionality prong in assessing the legality of preemptive force. It is not
that concerns about proportionality are not present, it is that the parties threatening the US are
less rational than the Soviets and have shown a willingness to cause mass civilian casualties on
US soil, making a greater use of force against them not only legal, but necessary.
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a state to preempt an
most prominent. The interceptive rule would permit
' 49
"unavoidable.
and
"imminent"
is
it
attack, but only if
As examples of acceptable interceptive defense, Professor Dinstein offers
the circumstances surrounding Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the
1967 Arab-Israeli War. He argues that if the United States had attacked Admiral
Yamamoto's carrier battle groups as they steamed towards Pearl Harbor, but
before launching their planes, America could have found justification in
interceptive self-defense. Similarly, he argues that Israel was legally justified in
attacking Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967, based upon the range of openly
hostile measures these states had taken. In particular, the Egyptian government
had ejected UN observers from the Gaza Strip and Sinai, closed the Straits of
Tiran, and mobilized its armed forces, which then engaged in threatening
movements. All of these activities were accompanied by shrill anti-Israeli
rhetoric.
There is, of course, no doubt that both of these instances would have met
the traditional test for a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense. Dinstein's
test, however, is difficult to apply with anything but hindsight. Would
interceptive self-defense by the United States have been justified if Japan's fleet
was not planning an attack, but merely maneuvering as a show of force? How
would it have been possible to tell the difference, absent that most unachievable
of grails, perfect intelligence? What if Israel's neighbors had been preparing to
negotiate, but preferred to do so from a position of overwhelming strength?
Even with the most reliable intelligence estimates, unless a state waits until an
attack has been physically launched,"0 which would meet even Governor
Stassen's test, it is impossible to know in advance whether an attack is genuinely
"unavoidable."
Only if one assumes that certain events are inevitable does interceptive
self-defense provide a sound legal basis on which states could actually base their
security. But certainty in history is the exception rather than the rule. The past is
replete with examples of crises building to a crescendo, when the use of force
seemed imminent and inevitable, only to dissipate because of last-minute
diplomatic interventions, a change of government, a failure of nerve, or merely a
change of mind. For instance, in the years leading up to World War I, there were
several instances when war was avoided at the last minute. Examples include the
1909 Austrian Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 1911 "Agadir Crisis," and
the 1912-1913 Balkan wars. In fact, it is often easier to predict, based on an
analysis of the long-term trends, what is eventual/y going to happen rather than
49
50

Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense at 172 (cited in note 15).
In which case, the doctrine becomes virtually indistinguishable from the traditional narrow
reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
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what will happen tomorrow, because the quality of strategic threat forecasts,
which involve broad shifts in the balance of power, tend to be better than the
assessment of tactical threats, which are particularized threats to the nation's
security. Accordingly, anticipatory self-defense against medium- and long-term
threats makes more sense, and appears more reliable, than interceptive selfdefense, which is geared toward thwarting unavoidable and imminent attacks.
Additionally, perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the "interceptive"
defense formulation is that any attempt to ground the doctrine in Article 51
would stretch the language of the Article beyond recognition. In 1967, for
example, no attack had actually "occurred" against Israel. It certainly looked
likely, but it had not happened-unless the movement of troops into positions
that would permit an attack meant that it was occurring. However, if the word
"occurs" is taken this far, then it could also perfectly well accommodate
the
traditional doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in full and allow preemption of
the far more distant threats.
E. COLLECTIVE ACTION

A second attempt at vindicating the Security Council's primacy, but
nevertheless permitting direct action by states without its blessing, can be
described as the collective action principle. Supporters of this view maintain that
only the Security Council can authorize the use of preemptive force by
individual states, but that collective actions can be justified where the Council
fails to act. For example, one European scholar, Brian Crowe, in attempting to
reconcile his opposition to the US-led regime change in Iraq with his
endorsement of the US-led campaign against Serbia in 1999, argues that, if the
Security Council was immobilized by the opposition of only one permanent
member, military intervention by a group of states could nevertheless proceed."1
51

In the case of Kosovo, Russia was firmly committed to the support of the Milosovic regime and
threatened to veto any Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Serbia.
Brian Crowe, A BreathtakingAssertion of PaxAmeria, 3 Euro Aff 28 (Fall 2002), available online
at <http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current-issue/2002fall/2002-faU_20.php4>
(visited
Nov 8, 2004). Ironically, given the efforts by the Bush Administration's critics to portray the
Kosovo intervention as being legal under the UN Charter, this particular intervention was not
legal, even under the most aggressive definition of anticipatory self-defense. See Laura Geissler,
The Law of HumanitarianIntervention and the Kosovo Crisis, 23 Hamline L Rev 323, 340-41 (2000);
Ved P. Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and InternationalLaw, 10 US Air Force J Intl
Stud 1, 10 (1999-2000). While the Milosevic regime was committing genocide against Kosovars,
it could not credibly be claimed that he posed even the most attenuated military threat to any of
the NATO members or any of his neighbors (while Milosevic had launched aggressive wars,
using both Belgrade's military and paramilitary proxies, against Slovenia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina, he was defeated and the prospects of renewed fighting in these areas was
nonexistent). Thus, the embrace of NATO's Kosovo campaign by critics of the US-led regime
change in Iraq demonstrates the infinite elasticity of the underlying legal rules. Similarly,
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"If,on the other hand, preemptive [US] military action were to follow total
disagreement in the Security Council, the effect on the United Nations and
international order and legitimacy would be devastating, the consequences far2
Similarly, other
reaching and the historical responsibility heavy."
commentators, including Yale's Bruce Ackerman and the University of
Houston's Jonathan Paust, argue that the Charter blesses regional, collective
actions, while limiting states acting "unilaterally" to Governor Stassen's view of
Article 51.
Thus, Professor Ackerman asserts that President Kennedy "relied on the
regional peacekeeping provisions of the U.N. Charter" because the US blockade
was endorsed by the Organization of American States ("OAS"), implying that
these provisions, and not the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, provided the
legal basis for Kennedy's actions.53 However, the Charter's "regional"
provisions, found in Chapter VIII, do not permit a regional organization to
operate as the Security Council's surrogate-quite the opposite. Article 53 denies
such organizations the right to take "enforcement action" pursuant to the
Charter, reserving this to the Security Council.
As a matter of international law, a group of states has no more inherent
right to use force than any one of its nation-state members, just as the illegal
action of an individual can not be legalized merely because he obtains the
agreement and assistance of his friends. To paraphrase the defense of
Archbishop Thomas Laud, two hundred couple of black rabbits do not a black
horse make. 4 Thus, it is not surprising that during the Cuban Missile Crisis the
foundation of the right of both the United States and the OAS to take action
against the Soviet Union and Cuba was the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, including the right to anticipate threats. In fact, the
October 23, 1962, OAS resolution supporting the quarantine of Cuba
specifically described the threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere
55
posed by the installation of offensive Soviet ballistic missiles. Overall, although
the imprimatur of a regional organization, or a military alliance like NATO, may

52

European criticisms of the Iraq liberation are driven not by law, but policy and politics, cloaked
in a pseudolegalistic language.
Crowe, 3 Euro Aff at 28 (cited in note 51).

53

Bruce Ackerman, But What's the Legal Casefor Preemption?,Wash Post B2 (Aug 18, 2002). This
view, in addition to its analytical idiosyncrasies, is belied by a 1962 DOJ legal opinion on the
Kennedy Administration's range of options with respect to Cuba and their legality, which
specifically noted that the UN Charter "does not prohibit the taking of unilateral preventive
action in self-defense prior to the occurrence of an armed attack." Department of State, Office
of Legal Counsel, Legal Opinion (1962).

54

Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642, 286 (Oxford 1981).

55

See 47 US Dept St Bull 722, 722 (1962).
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be a valuable diplomatic tool, it does not create a legal right to use force in and
of itself.
F. PARADE OF HORRIBLES
Another argument advanced against preemption is that it will result in
more, not fewer, conflicts. Where once it was argued that the Soviet nuclear
buildup was merely a reaction to a US-initiated arms race, it now is asserted that
the key to maintaining international peace and stability is to "ratchet up" the
level of justification necessary for the use of armed force. The reasoning here
appears to be that, by allowing states to use force in advance of an actual attack,
the use of military force for defense purposes will be more, and not less,
frequent. The recent Pakistan-India standoff, and its attendant dangers, is often
cited as the archetype for problems posed by preemptive military postures.
There is, of course, no doubt that the anticipatory self-defense right can be
misused, and that a "rush" to military action can result in terrible miscalculation.
These dangers, however, must be weighed against the nature and scope of the
threats presented in today's world. As suggested above, a rule of law requiring
that a state stay its hand until the enemy's first broadside is fired was hopelessly
unrealistic, even at the time the UN Charter was adopted. Indeed, even the
"imminence" requirement suggested by Webster in his Caroline correspondence
(assuming that this is accepted as a prerequisite to preemptive action) must be
interpreted today in a different light than in 1842, when the most powerful
weapon was a muzzle-loading naval cannon with a maximum range of about
three miles. Given the manner in which al Qaeda and its allies prepare and carry
out attacks, the only way to preempt such groups successfully may well be to act
months, or even years, in advance of the actual attack being launched. For
example, even if the US had toppled the Taliban regime in the summer of 2001,
or succeeded in eliminating bin Laden himself during that time period, it would
not have necessarily prevented the September 11 attacks. Most of the
perpetrators had already infiltrated the US, and they could have proceeded
without additional help or instructions from their superiors.5 6

56

The final aspect of the Caroline doctrine that is salient to anticipatory self-defense is Webster's
notion that it must be proportional to the threat, involving "nothing unreasonable or
excessive." See Daniel Webster, Letter to Lord Ashburton (cited in note 6). However, given the
potential availability of WMD to terrorists and rogue states, the United States should not be
appreciably hampered by this consideration. Few would disagree that, a dozen years after the
Cold War's end, the world remains a dangerous place-in some respects more so now than
when the superpowers glared at each other across the Elbe. The US response to a hostile
dictatorship that is seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction can be decisive and lethal;
carrying out a regime change would be perfectly appropriate.
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The principle of deterrence, which may serve as a substitute, did avoid a
general war between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact; even though numerous
conflicts raged in the Third World, both superpowers primarily used surrogates
and proxies to carry them out.5 7 But deterrence can be effective only against
states or individuals that may be deterred. It is the emergence of men and
organizations that are "beyond" deterrence that makes the right to preemptive
defense so critical.58 President Bush has clearly articulated this problem: even the
most robust deterrence "means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with
no nation or citizens to defend," and containment is not possible "when
57

58

In both Korea and Vietnam, the US confronted Soviet allies and advisors. In Afghanistan, the
Soviets faced indigenous opposition that was aided by the US. In many other instances, neither
Washington nor Moscow were directly engaged, with their respective surrogates battling it out
in places ranging from Angola to Ethiopia to Nicaragua. Most of these conflicts were
protracted affairs and preemption was not a key policy imperative. Moreover, as the ICJ pointed
out in the Nicaragua case, such techniques as the use of proxy forces, provision of arms and
advisors, intelligence sharing, and other forms of support, while in the nature of the use of
force, did not amount to an armed attack sufficient to come within the purview of Article 51 of
the UN Charter. See Nicaragua v United States, 1986 ICJ at 347 (cited in note 30). These
techniques were, of course, equally available to both sides, although Moscow used them more
frequently during the Cold War than did the US.
Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues that we are facing today an ancient, yet reborn, type of an
enemy:
who, in Homer's words, "call up the wild joy of war" [and for whom] like
Achilles and the ancient Greeks harassing Troy, the thrill of violence
substitutes for the joys of domesticity and feasting. Achilles exclaims, "You
talk of food? I have no taste for food-what I really crave is slaughter and
blood and the choking groans of men."
...

Robert D. Kaplan, WarriorPolitics: Why Leadersho Demands a Pagan Ethos 118-19 (Vintage 2002).
One of America's best military historians, Victor Davis Hanson, emphasizes the importance of
appearing tough and decisive in all aspects of our warfare, arguing, for example, that our
restraint during the major combat phase of the Iraq conflict has emboldened the enemy and has
set the stage for a more dangerous insurgency campaign.
Worried about inflicting excessive damage on a tottering enemy in front of a
worldwide television audience, we employed non-explosive GPS bombs,
passed over retreating units of the Republican Guard, and avoided hitting
infrastructure. Such magnanimity and caution in the midst of a deadly conflict,
while admirable and understandable, may in hindsight have sent the wrong
message, first to looters, who made free with the infrastructure we spared,
then to nascent private militias, and finally to entire cadres of resistance in
Fallujah and Najaf-the message, that is, that US forces, overly circumspect in
war, would not in its aftermath put down those who could and should be put
down.

Victor Davis Hanson, Do We Have Enough Troops in Iraq?, 117 Commentary 30-31 Oune 2004).
Charles Dunlap has made the same point, albeit in the larger context of fighting against a broad
range of today's rogue regimes. See generally David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, Leashing the
Dogs of War, 73 Natl Interest 57 (Fall 2003). The proposition that a perception of weakness on
the part of a prosperous state usually invites attacks by the barbarians is as old as history itself
and has been articulated by, among others, Edward Gibbon. See Edward Gibbon, 2 Histogy of
the Decline and Fallof the Roman Empire ch 38 (Harper 1880).
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unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those
weapons surreptitiously to our shores or secretly provide them to terrorist
allies."5 9
IV.

EUROPE'S REJECTION OF PREEMPTION: SHOULD WE TAKE

HEED?
A. OLD FRIENDS AND NEW ENEMIES
In addition, of course, the Bush Administration's assertion of the right to
preempt threats has been condemned because it has "alienated" the international
community in general, and Europe in particular. This may well be so. Certainly
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has asserted that the use of armed force
against Saddam Hussein, by the United States and its Coalition of the Willing,
was illegal because the UN Security Council had not specifically authorized the
action.6" Moreover, there is no doubt that a majority of Europe's people, and the
governments of important European states such as France and Germany,
support the Secretary-General's rejection of America's legal position. They
opposed the use of military force to depose Saddam Hussein and by extension
the United States's appeal to preemptive defense. Indeed, even the British
Government, which joined the United States in the Iraq campaign, invoked
previous UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force against
Iraq, rather than anticipatory self-defense, as the legal justification for the war."
59

60

61

George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at West Point Militagy Academy (June 1,
2002), 1 Pub Papers (2002), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/06/20020601-3.html> (visited Nov 14, 2004).
Kofi Annan articulated the view that, outside of the narrow self-defense circumstances arising
out of an armed attack, all uses of military force had to be derived from "the unique legitimacy
provided by the United Nations Security Council." Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Address at the College of William and Magy, Williamsbuig Viginia (Feb 8, 2003),
available online at <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=252> (visited Oct 22, 2004).
In September 2004, Annan elaborated upon his earlier claims by arguing explicitly that the Iraq
war was illegal. See CNN, Annan: Iraq War Was '71lega/' (Sept 16, 2004), available online at
<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/09/16/iran.annan.ap/>
(visited Nov 14,
2004). As a continuation of this legal offensive, a study group, convened by Kofi Annan, whose
ostensible charter was to study ways to reform the UN, is apparently drafting guidelines
designed to limit the circumstances in which anticipatory defense can be invoked. See Heather
J. Carlson, UN Panelto Frame Guidelines on Legaliy of Pre-Emptive Strike, Wash Times Al (Oct 6,
2004). The fact that such guidelines would be of no legal significance does not diminish their
political importance.
For an interesting discussion of the way in which this issue was handled by British Attorney
General Lord Goldsmith, see Andrew Gilligan, Why Did the Attorny General Change His Advice?,
Spectator 12 (Mar 6, 2004). In his article, Gilligan describes the rather convoluted manner in
which Goldsmith has proceeded, apparently first ruling in late September 2002 "that a war to
topple Saddam Hussein would be illegal," but later changing his mind in March of 2003. "The
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Why this should be the case, given that European states both developed the
concept of anticipatory self-defense and have used it to their benefit for
centuries, is not entirely clear-although there are a number of possible
explanations.
First, the Bush Administration's open proclamation of the preemptive right
as a matter of principle, rather than simply employing it in practice, doubtless
irritated European diplomatic sensibilities. Even those who may privately
concede the legal point see little merit in the NSS's blunt wording. This,
however, misunderstands the proper relationship between that document's ends
and means. Although a declaration of principle is most useful when it both
deters enemies and reassures friends, these goals cannot always be achieved
simultaneously. It is evident that, in the Bush Administration's view, the need to
deter enemies was paramount, given the unusually acute threat from groups or
regimes that are exceptionally difficult to deter. As observed by Walter Russell
Mead:
While critics saw this [NSS] as part of a pattern of irresponsible crisis
mongering, there is little doubt that the administration believed that it was
more important to frighten and deter potential enemies than to reassure
friends. If the good guys had to be scared in order to make sure the bad
guys knew you were serious, so be it. This approach not only reflected the
Jacksonian element in the administration; it was also a message to
Jacksonian opinion in the United States that the Bush administration
considered defense of the American homeland its primary interest and duty,

difference [according to Gilligan's description of Goldsmith's subsequent thinking] is that in
November 2002 the UN has passed a further resolution 1441, offering Iraq a 'final opportunity'
to disarm. Iraq failed to comply. That failure 'revived' an earlier authorization to use force
under resolutions 687 and 678, 13 and 12 years old respectively .... " See id. The notion that
earlier Security Council resolutions had somehow become "stale" and had to be "revived" is
somewhat bizarre. The more legally attractive view is that, even prior to the passage of
Resolution 1441, the entire body of preexisting Security Council Resolutions provided an ample
legal basis to effect a regime change in Iraq. Resolution 1441 was certainly helpful, but not
necessary. In any case, one, unfortunately, senses that even Britain has adopted a most crabbed
interpretation ofjus ad bellum rules. In reality, the US-led regime change in Iraq could be legally
supported on multiple grounds, including the argument that the first Gulf War, circa 1991,
never ended-Saddam Hussein has violated his cease-fire commitments and there have been
ongoing hostilities between his forces and Coalition troops. See, for example, Andru Wall, The
Legal Casefor Invading Iraq and Toppling Saddam Hussein, 32 Israeli YB Hum Rts 165 (2002). For a
discussion of the entire range of legal grounds for the Coalition action against Saddam Hussein,
see David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, We Have a Right to Oust Saddam, Wall St J A20 (Feb
27, 2002). However, the legality of the Iraq War came to be analyzed primarily within the
context of anticipatory self-defense, in part because the war's critics believed that, here, they
were on strongest grounds.
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relations with allies, would be allowed to
and that nothing, not even
62
compromise this mission.

Moreover, although domestic critics challenge the Bush Administration's
alleged undue emphasis on preemption, many do not deny its overall validity.
Indeed, during the September 2004 presidential debates, Senator John Kerry
declared that any American President would use preemptive strikes, if necessary.
The contrast between him and President Bush was over the circumstances in
which preemption could be employed.
In addition, there is little doubt that some European critics of the NSS
were also motivated by concerns with preemption's potential for abuse, and
even an impractical-if deeply held--desire to abolish war in all its forms.
Nevertheless, the motivation of many-especially officials in France and
Germany-appears to have involved a heavy dose of simple anti-Americanism.63
It is, of course, the United States which is viewed as the most obvious
beneficiary of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine at this time, and, for more
and military
than a few European policymakers, curbing US power in general,
6
capabilities in particular, has clearly become a policy priority.

The emergence of a "unipolar" state of affairs after the Cold War,
dominated by what one former French foreign minister described as the
American "hyperpower,"6 is the principal threat scenario that appears to trouble

Paris, Berlin, and Brussels. Just as importantly, Europe's ability to itself project
military power, or even to make a meaningful contribution to those military

62

63

64

65

Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror,Peace, and War Amenca's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk 115
(Knopf 2004).
Some observers have remarked upon the existence of an interesting synergistic relationship
between anti-Americanism and pacifism. As noted by George Orwell, long before the Bush
Administration came into office, pacifism has often been driven by anti-Americanism. Writing
in 1945, Orwell bemoaned the existence of
intellectual pacifists, whose real though unacknowledged motive appears to be
hatred of Western democracy and admiration for totalitarianism. Pacifist
propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other,
but if one looks closely at the writing of the younger intellectual pacifists, one
finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval, but are
directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States....
George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism (Polemic 1945), reprinted in George Orwell, Essays 878
(Knopf 2002) (John Carey, ed).
The use of law as a way of disciplining American power can be described as "lawfare." See
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Role of the Lanyer in War It Ain't No TV Show: JAGs and Modern
Militagy Operations, 4 Chi J Ind L 479, 480 (2003) ("Lawfare is specifically the strategy of using,
or misusing, law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational
objective."). For a discussion of these issues, see David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, The
Rocky Shoals ofInternationalLaw62 The Nad Interest 35 (Winter 2000-01).
See Hubert Vedrine, France in an Age of GlobaliZation (Brookings Inst 2001) (Philip H. Gordon,
trans).
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ventures of which it does approve-such as the deployments to Bosnia and
Kosovo-has decreased to the point of embarrassment.6 6 Although the postWorld War II alliance between the United States and Western Europe was
always asymmetrical, current and projected European defense budgets and
demographic trends suggest that the Old World is simply incapable of
dispatching large numbers of troops to fight alongside the United States. Indeed,
Europe has been so strained by the comparatively modest requirements of the
Afghan mission-involving the deployment of fewer than 9,000 troops 6 -- that
it is difficult to envision how Germany or France could have contributed much
to the Iraq operation, even if they had supported the Bush Administration's aim
to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Not surprisingly, the simple inability to
go to war goes hand-in-hand with efforts to make resorts to force as difficult as
possible, including efforts effectively to proscribe anticipatory self-defense.68
66

67

68

Lord George Robertson, former Secretary-General of NATO, has repeatedly commented on
Europe's poor military preparation. See Lord George Robinson, Speech at the First Magazine
Dinner,
Claridge's
Hotel,
London
(Jan,
24
2002),
available
online
at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/sO20124a.htm>
(visited Nov 18, 2004); Lord
George Robinson, Remarks at The Brookings Institution, Brookings Leadership Forum (Oct
22, 2002). For instance, Germany "suffers from major shortcomings in precision-guided
munitions, command and control ability, and strategic airlift," and it "had to charter Ukrainian
aircraft to transport 2,300 troops to Afghanistan." See Nicole A. Manara, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Militagy Trends in Germany: Strengths and Weaknesses 13 (July 28, 2004).
The situation is not much better in France-according to Jane's military assessment of the
country, "Lt]he French armed forces are not configured for modern warfare, in which high
technology is critical." Mehmet Emre Furton, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Military Trends in France: Strengths and Weaknesses 6 (July 26, 2004). See also Jackson Diehl,
NATO's Mjth'in Afghanistan, Wash Post A17 (July 5, 2004).
The official command structure in Afghanistan underwent a change in 2004, with the so-called
Eurocorps--established in 1992 as the European Union's fledgling army-taking over from
NATO. This, however, has not resulted in an increase in the number of troops deployed in that
country. Moreover, virtually all air assets have come from the US; the European troops had to
hire Ukrainian-owned transport planes to deploy to Afghanistan in the first place. As described
by Jackson Diehl,
[l]ast year the allies resolved to expand a modest peacekeeping force in Kabul
to provincial centers around the country, an operation critical to bolstering the
authority of the weak pro-Western government and making possible the
national elections planned for [October 2004]. Yet, after months and months
of haggling, European governments were only barely able to commit at [the
Istanbul NATO summit] to staffing three new provincial centers, each with a
couple of hundreds troops. The cup-rattling forced on Secretary-General Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer was humiliating: With 26 nations and 5 million men in arms
to draw on, Scheffer struggled to obtain just three helicopters for the Afghan
operation.
Diehl, NATO's Myth' in Afghanistan (cited in note 66).
For an excellent description of the entire range of American-European differences on key
military and foreign policy issues, see generally Robert Kagan, Of Paradiseand PowerAmerica and
Europe in the New World Order (Knopf 2003); Francis Fukuyama, State Building. Governance and
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Moreover, Europe appears to be more concerned with the possibility that
states embracing the anticipatory defense strategy will overreact and strike
without sufficient provocation than with the consequences of failing to stop a
WMD-seeking foe before it attacks. These European views reflect some rather
fundamental differences between the US and most Western European elites
over the nature of the threat the West faces in the post-September 11 world,69
and the extent to which the promotion of democracy and freedom should
constitute Western foreign policy goals in the Greater Middle East.7 0
Of course, these profound transatlantic differences are not new. They have
been around for decades, but were largely obscured by the imperatives of the
Cold War, in which Europe's need for the infusion of American military,
political, and economic power to offset the Soviet threat caused it to temporarily
forego the pacifism prompted by World War 1. As argued by Max Boot,
[b]ecause one war [WWI] had been senseless, many concluded that all wars
must be senseless. The myopic militarism of the pre-1914 generation

produced, in reaction, an equally myopic pacifism among the post-1918
generation that gave free rein to predatory states like Nazi Germany and
imperial Japan. The children of 1945, in turn, spurned appeasement and
held the line against communism for almost half a century.
Now a new generation is in charge in Europe: the children of 1989.
Their political sensibility was shaped by the end of the Cold War .

.

. a

struggle between good and evil-no longer speaks to them. World War I
exemplifies their vision of warfare: cruel and senseless. They do not want to

69

70

World Orderin the 21st Century (Cornell 2004). For a useful discussion of some of the historical
causes of the current transadantic policy differences, see Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr.,
Europe in the Balance, 107 Poly Rev 41 (June/July 2001).
Many domestic critics of the Bush Administration, including much of the Democratic Party
foreign policy establishment, have ascribed these differences primarily to the Administration's
alleged diplomatic ineptness. However, the notion that France and Germany would oppose an
American policy that they otherwise believed to be in their national interests merely because
they dislike George W. Bush is risible, and far more insulting to Paris and Berlin than to the
President.
During the recent G8 Sea Island Georgia Summit, French President Chirac scornfully described
the Bush Administration's plans to promote democracy in the Middle East as "missionary
work" and indicated that he opposed them. See Irwin M. Stelzer, D-Day, Chirac Style, Weekly
Standard 10 (June21, 2004). The causes of the current Western European attitudes may well, as
postulated by George Weigel, be rooted in European views about the most fundamental aspects
of the human condition: "Over and above specific disagreement with American policies in the
global war against terrorism, one senses an instinctual recoil from, even a horror of the idea that
freedom . . . is a gift from God that must be actively defended, if necessary through the 'hard
power' of armed force." George Weigel, The Cathedraland the Cube: Reflections on EuropeanMorale,
117 Commentary 33, 38 (June 2004).
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fight alongside the United States, in Iraq or anywhere else; they see nothing
71
worth fighting for.

In short, with the immediate and obvious threat posed by the Soviet Union
gone, Europe itself peaceful, and the burden of ensuring global security firmly
mounted on America's back, Europe is free to indulge itself in the luxury of
pacifism-even to a point of denying states, or at least the United States, the
legal right to defend itself in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of
war.
B. POLICY DIFFERENCES

Finally, there are simply profound policy differences between Washington
and Europe over how the "war on terror" should be fought, with Europe's elite
favoring a solution to what then-EU External Relations Commissioner
Christopher Patten has called "the root causes of terrorism and violence, ' 72 and
over how the Iraq issue should have been handled. While these differences are
71

72

Max Boot, Risky Pathfor PacifistEurope, LA Times BI 1 (une 3, 2004). An old adage states that
generals are always refighting the last war. For Europe's politicians, however, the war they
remain obsessed with is World War I, which they see as essentially a meaningless conflict, with
no great moral issues at stake, triggered by failures of statecraft on all sides, and causing
appalling casualties from which many European countries never fully recovered. The fact that
some historians view these assertions as oversimplistic and ascribe substantial responsibility for
the war to a distinctly aggressive Wilhelmine Germany does not negate the enduring power of
the more traditional European assessments. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see
generally David Fromkin, Europe's Last Summer (Knopf 2004).
Jonathan Freedland, Interview: Breaking the Silence, Guardian (London) 8 (Feb 9, 2002).
Interestingly, a recent op-ed by the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince bin Sultan
bin Abdulaziz 'Al-Saud, argues that the only root cause of terrorism is the evil nature of
terrorists and that eliminating them is the only way to survive.
[Today's] deviants did not appear for the first time in our era . . . . The
deviants did not appear because [our] nation has connections with America or
with Christians and Jews, or because of Israel's aggression against the
Palestinian brethren, or because of events in Fallujah or Chechnya ....
Enough blaming others when the reason lies within our own ranks! Enough
demagoguery at this critical stage in our history! We must all, as a state and as a
people, recognize the truth about these criminals. These criminals have
disseminated corruption in the land, and it is incumbent upon us-the rulers,
the clerics, and the citizens-to keep the word of Allah: "The punishment of
those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive to spread
corruption in the land is only this, that they should be murdered."
Verbatim: Prince Bandar;A Diplomat's Callfor War, Wash Post B4 (une 6, 2004). It is ironic that a
devout Wahabi Muslim, a member of the Saudi Arabian royal family, and a man who clearly
disapproves of many aspects of American policy in the Middle East nevertheless understands
far better that most European politicians the folly of looking for so-called root causes. The fact
that his article was not written for the Western audience, but appeared in the Saudi government
daily, Al-Watan, and deployed the most powerful argument in the Islamic intellectual
tradition-comparing today's terrorists to the deviants of the yesteryear who opposed Prophet
Mohammed and the early Caliphs-rendered it particularly authoritative.
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usually cloaked in the language of law, they are not legal in nature. For example,
when European opinion largely supported armed intervention against Serbia in
1999, the lack of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force
(or even a plausible argument based in self-defense) did not prevent European
governments, and particularly the governments of France and Germany, from
supporting military intervention.73 In an effort to resolve this contradiction,
some commentators have argued that humanitarian interventions, like the one in
Kosovo, enjoy a special status under international law and are always legally
permissible.74
However, it is at best inconsistent to argue that humanitarian intervention
to aid the residents of another country who are being brutalized by their rulers is
legal under the UN Charter (presumably because it is always consistent with the
Charter's laudable goals), but a national interest-driven intervention based on
anticipatory self-defense considerations is somehow illegitimate. 75 Leaving aside
the issue of a rather idiosyncratic reading of the UN Charter, which, on its face,
does not actually legitimize humanitarian interventions even if authorized by the
Security Council unless they genuinely present a threat to the peace, it is not
obvious why this humanitarian intervention principle only applies to the
protection of foreign nationals, rather than a state's own citizens. In a postSeptember 11 world, US actions to destroy terrorist organizations and their

73

Some scholars also argue that NATO's use of force against Milosovic's Serbia was simply more
consonant with the UN's purposes. See Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Temrrists in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond, 35 Cornell Intl L J 533, 546 (2002). For a contrasting view, see
Robert F. Turner, OperationIraqi Freedom: Legal and Poliy Considerations,27 Harv J L & Pub Poly
765, 777-78 (2004). This argument, however, whatever its intrinsic merits, is about policy and
not law.

74

The argument, usually used by the proponents of humanitarian intervention, is that after the
decades of development of international humanitarian law, which has sharply curtailed the
ability of governments to treat their citizens in any way they see fit, there has arisen the socalled "responsibility to prevent." This duty to prevent, described in a recent report
commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, allegedly establishes not simply a right but a duty
to intervene whenever sufficiently grave human rights abuses are found to take place, even if
such an intervention does not command support of the Security Council. United Nations,
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Rerponsibilioy to Protect (Dec
online at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission2001), available
Report.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004). While a few scholars acknowledge that this view of
international law is generally inconsistent with a narrow reading of Article 51, most of the
humanitarian intervention advocates do not seem to acknowledge this problem.

75

While the UN has in the past extolled the legal permissibility of humanitarian interventions, see
id, only a few proponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention espouse the view that the
Charter is similarly permissive when it comes to national security-driven interventions. See
generally Lee Feinstein and Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 Foreign Aff 136
an/Feb 2004).
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sponsors are the equivalent of a humanitarian intervention in defense of
American citizens.
Indeed, humanitarian intervention imperatives can even buttress, rather
than discredit, strategies of anticipatory self-defense. Today's attacks by rogue
states and al Qaeda-type groups typically involve attacks on civilians, rather than
strikes against military targets. Protecting civilians, to the extent possible, from
the ravages of war is one of the primary humanitarian goals underlying the law
of armed conflict. It follows that any comprehensive acceptance of humanitarian
intervention must necessarily consider options that will prevent these attacks on
civilians, foremost among which is anticipatory self-defense.
In this connection, it certainly is reasonable to argue that removing from
power a man like Saddam Hussein-who sought nuclear weapons, developed,
deployed, and used both chemical and biological weapons on his own people
and his neighbors, viewed himself as a modern day Saladin, and defied Security
Council resolutions for well over a decade-was entirely consistent with the UN
Charter and the various Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force
against Iraq and demanding that Saddam comply with the obligations that he
accepted as the price of a cease-fire during the Persian Gulf War.
C. THE MISSING STOCKPILES

Since Saddam Hussein was deposed, critics have claimed that the war was
illegal, and the doctrine of preemption discredited, because no WMD stockpiles
were uncovered in Iraq. As a legal matter, however, the principle of anticipatory
self-defense does not, and has never, required that the threat have been
genuine-only that it be perceived to be so in good faith. In this respect,
Saddam's agreement to disarm did not, obviously, render his regime harmless.
Iraq retained active WMD development programs and engaged in an elaborate
strategic cat-and-mouse game, denying any WMD-related ambitions, while
behaving as if it already had substantial weapon stockpiles.76 Moreover, by 2003,
the policy of containment, based on UN sanctions, was under severe pressure,
with permanent Security Council members France and Russia working to relieve
Saddam of even this burden.
It is also the case that, if Saddam Hussein's regime had outlasted the UN
sanctions-something that was within Iraq's grasp by the late 1990s-the

76

For a discussion of this issue, including an analysis of how Saddam's strategic deception policy
was, in some key respects, similar to the missile bluff strategy pursued by the late Soviet leader,
Nikita Khrushchev, see David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, Saddam, Nikita and Virtual

Weapons of Mass Destruction:A Question of Threat Perception and Intelligence Assessment, In the Nad
Interest (June 12, 2003), available online at <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/articles/
vol2issue23/vol2iss23rivkincasey.html> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
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regime would have most likely shifted to a far more robust WMD development
and deployment strategy. Overall, it would have been impossible to predict
precisely when Saddam Hussein would have fully completed rebuilding his
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Certainly, the past record of predicting
the pace and particulars of the Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons programs,
for example, was far from perfect. Aside from the inherent difficulties of
penetrating a closed, repressive society, the pace of any complicated weapons
program is impossible to gage reliably. In all likelihood, even Saddam Hussein
himself may have not known for sure when his efforts would have borne fruit.
Meanwhile, Saddam's use of chemical weapons against his own people, his
support for terrorist organizations, and his oft-stated hatred for the United
States-which he correctly regarded as the only impediment to his domination
of the Arab world-made his intentions quite clear.
In any case, from beginning to end, the burden was on Saddam Hussein to
prove that he had fully disarmed-not on the anti-Saddam Coalition to prove
that he retained weapons stockpiles or research programs. The broader point,
repeatedly made by the Bush Administration during the months leading up to
the war, was that rogue regimes that played hide-and-seek games rather than
pursuing various confidence-building measures capable of reassuring the
international community that they were fully and irreversibly disarmed would be
disarmed, by force if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION

There are many commentators, activists, and government officials who
would like to substantially limit the right of anticipatory self-defense by vesting
the legal power to authorize the use of military force, both before and after an
attack is actually launched, in the UN Security Council alone. This, they
evidently believe, would serve to constrain the use of American military power,
and presumably channel its use in ways that will serve their own policy
preferences.
Acceptance of such a rule, however, would require the United States and
its citizens, as well as the citizens of other states, to absorb an enemy's first
strike. This was unrealistic in 1945, and it remains so today. Indeed, the
development of ever more destructive weapons and the growing ability of
nonstate actors to obtain chemical, biological, and, potentially, nuclear weapons
make such a rule irresponsible and reckless. The alternative to preemption was,
and remains, deterrence. Deterrence, however, is a strategy that assumes rational
actors who share the fundamental values of international peace and security, or
at least who benefit from a healthy instinct for self preservation. It is of little
value against individuals and organizations who value their own lives not much
more than the lives of their victims.
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Providing for the common defense is the most fundamental role of any
government-the very purpose of the social contract. The right of states to
anticipate threats to their territory, citizens, and interests, and to act
preemptively, has been recognized since commentators began to discuss the law
of nations, and practiced a good deal before that. The United Nations Charter
did not eliminate this right, and the practice of states since that instrument was
drafted confirms this conclusion. There is little doubt that the right of
anticipatory self-defense or preemption can be, and has been, abused over
time-few rights have not been. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most basic
norms of international law.
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